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The idea that the form of linguistic expres-
sions ismodulated by output requirements
is widely accepted in current approaches
in linguistics, including those taking
“extremely nativist” positions. Thus, for
instance, the Minimalist Program devel-
oped in recent years by Chomsky (1995)
holds that language form is strongly deter-
mined by the requirements imposed on
it by the two main interfaces it links: on
the one hand the conceptual-intentional
domain of meaning, and on the other, the
sensorimotor domain by means of which
linguistic expressions are externalized.
Within psycholinguistics, consideration
of the impact that processing require-
ments have on the form of sentences
can be traced back to Yngve’s Depth
Hypothesis (Yngve, 1960), which iden-
tified an asymmetry in the incidence
of left-branching and right-branching
grammatical structures in English due
to processing constraints. Thomas Bever
(Bever, 1970), in a seminal paper gen-
erally acknowledged to pioneer modern
psycholinguistics, put forth and discussed
the hypothesis that the form of language
reflects general cognitive laws, in such a
way that mechanisms of language learn-
ing and processing partially determine the
form of grammar. Fodor et al. (1974) inte-
grated ideas in philosophy, psychology,
and linguistics to explain what was called
language performance, that is, language
production and comprehension. At the
time, the possibility that the form of gram-
matical structures might be determined by
domain-general behavioral systems was
thought of as an important challenge
to linguistics. However, after decades of
interdisciplinary language study, this view
it is now endorsed to varying degrees by
most linguists and cognitive scientists,
including those in “classic theories” which
also hold the view that certain central
architectural aspects of human language
are not dependent on experience but
rather imposed on it by organism-internal
biases (Berwick et al., 2013).
The question, then, is not whether out-
put/input factors related to the produc-
tion and perception (i.e., externalization)
of language modulates linguistic form, but
rather how they do it and whether that
is all there is to linguistic form. Put dif-
ferently, what needs to be determined
is whether externalization factors can
account for linguistic categories like Noun
or Preposition that are distinct (though
related to) conceptual entities; whether
externalization conditions chisel discrete-
ness into linguistic categories (phonemes,
words, and phrases); whether externaliza-
tion forces a combinatorial and hierarchi-
cal structure on language.
MacDonald (2013) presents us with a
thorough discussion of some principles
operating on language production, and
suggests a significant impact of those prin-
ciples on the form of language and gram-
mar. The discussion is adequately framed
within the general theme of the relative
weight that organism internal factors and
experience have in cognition. The paper
opens with some reference to findings on
motion perception and object-face recog-
nition, and it summarizes the state of
the art acknowledging that “While such
accounts don’t deny innate factors in per-
ception, they are notable in ascribing a
central role for experience in development
and in adult performance.”
Two are the issues under discussion
here. One is whether externalization (pro-
duction) demands can fully account for
language form, or whether externaliza-
tion demands modulate language form in
concurrence with other factors, some of
which are organism internal and previ-
ous to experience, as in other aspects of
cognition. If the first position were cor-
rect, then language would be truly distinct,
and very much unlike motion perception,
face recognition, and other cognitive func-
tions in not involving innate, organism
internal factors in its structure and devel-
opment. The question is not whether expe-
rience plays a key role in development and
adult performance, since no account of
language denies that, but whether experi-
ence is all that is required to explain its
nature, a more controversial view, particu-
larly among scholars devoted to the study
of language form.
The position defended by MacDonald
does not appear to fall completely in this
latter class, because the strong position
at the start of the paper is softened into
the claim that “the memory and planning
demands of language production strongly
affect the form of producers’ utterances,”
a statement that views externalization-
production demands as one molding fac-
tor, leaving space for others. Indeed, few
language researchers would feel uncom-
fortable agreeing with MacDonald “not
that all aspects of language form and
comprehension can be traced to the
computational demands of language pro-
duction, but rather that production’s
impact in these areas is so pervasive that
understanding production becomes essen-
tial to explaining why language is the way
it is, and why language comprehension
works the way it does.” The interest of the
current proposal lies in the details, that
is, in showing how production can explain
why language is the way it is. In scientific
thinking, a más cómo menos por qué, the
more we know about how, the less we need
to ponder about why (Wagensberg, 2006).
MacDonald argues that language form
is significantly molded by two general
domain principles that seek to unbur-
den computational requirements on the
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part of the speaker: Easy First and
Plan Reuse. Easier elements are put first
in the sequence, and speakers tend to
use again the types of sentences they
have just heard. In order to evalu-
ate the predictive capabilities of these
two principles, we need to know what
types of elements are easy, and what a
plan is. Regarding what is easy in lan-
guage, it involves words that are eas-
ily retrieved, and since the reasons why
a given word or phrase might be easy
to retrieve can be many, the criteria
for easiness are heterogeneous, includ-
ing frequency, length (favoring shorter
words and phrases), complexity (favor-
ing syntactically less complex elements),
importance for the speaker, previously
mentioned material, newly mentioned
material. MacDonald is well aware of the
possible circularity and lack of predictive
power of this principle; it is one thing
to argue for analogies in the navigation
or action-planning system regarding the
easy-first principle, and another to show
that it is operational in accounting for
language form.
As examples, let us consider some
aspects of linguistic form and how prin-
ciples seeking to minimize difficulty dur-
ing production might relate to them. We
will consider a simple sentence form from
English, shown in (1):
(1) There are men in the room
This is an existential sentence, a very
simple type of statement, which never-
theless involves a number of interesting
form-related particularities, as existential
sentences do across languages. This is
one reason why they have been exten-
sively studied in linguistics (from Milsark,
1979; to Moro, 1997; among many others).
From the perspective of easy-first, it would
appear that both there and men could
appear first in the sentence, because they
are short and frequent words, with men
having the advantage of being animate,
and therefore conceptually very salient.
But only there can take the first place in an
existential English sentence. Consider how
other attempts fail:
(2) (a) ∗men are there in the room
(b) ∗men are in the room there
(c) ∗men there are in the room
To account for these patterns, the Plan
Reuse principle can be appealed to:
English-speakers are used to hearing
existential sentences in that form, and
that is why they keep using them in
such a form. The question that lingers is
then why English should have chosen a
plan that violates easy-first to begin with.
Particularly, when it appears that noth-
ing stands in the way of not saying that
initial and apparently semantically redun-
dant word there, as shown by the Spanish
example in (3):
(3) Hay hombres en la habitación
Are men in the room
“there are men in the room”
One could also wonder about why, given
the easy-first principle, this Spanish sen-
tence doesn’t turn into (4), placing the
most salient piece of information at the
start, particularly given the relative free-
dom or word order that Spanish displays
in other regards:
(4) ∗hombres hay en la habitación
A purported example of easy-first in
action, as discussed by MacDonald, is
the choice between active and passive in
English, which speakers can allegedly use
to place easier elements early. However,
these subtle choices, if they could account
for the passive and active sentences pro-
duced in English, can hardly account for
one central type of question that lin-
guists try to answer, which revolves around
the class of possible and impossible sen-
tences, rather than preferred and dispre-
ferred ones.
Turning back to linguistic form, the
central types of question linguists seek
answers to involve contrasts like the one
in (5) between Dutch and English. Why
can Dutch create passive sentences out of
intransitive (unergative) verbs as in (5a),
whereas English or Spanish cannot (5b, c)?
(5) (a) Er wordt door Jan getelefoneerd
There was by Jan telephoned
(b) ∗It/there was telephoned by John
(c) ∗fue telefoneado por Juan
Similarly, accounting for the form of lan-
guage requires understanding how is it that
passive constructions are characteristic
of nominative languages like English,
Spanish, and Dutch above, and how is
it that they are missing in ergative lan-
guages, where instead of passives we find
a different type of construction known
as antipassive, illustrated in (6) for Inuit
(examples from Bobaljik, 1992):
(6) (a) Jaani-up tuktu tuqut-vaa
Jaani-Erg caribou kill-3sg-3sg
“Jaani killed a caribou”
(b) Jaani tuktu-mik tuqut-si-vuq
Jaani caribou-P kill-antp-3sg
“Jaani killed (by/at) caribous”
In the last decades, linguistics has gained
a deeper understanding of the central
issues about the form of languages, and
a large part of the explanation does not
involve principles like easy-first or plan
reuse. This, of course, does not mean that
avoidance of computational burden is not
operational in language production. But
it does mean that a persuasive approach
to linguistic form, whatever its type, must
present coherent accounts of these types of
typological correlations.
The times are ripe for a truly interdis-
ciplinary quest to understand the complex
nature of language, and there are many
new outlooks that seek to find what the
underlying forces are that make language
so easy to use, but so hard to characterize
(see Sanz et al., 2013 for a current forum).
I thoroughly agree with MacDonald that
the separation of psycholinguists who
study production and perception mecha-
nisms of language and linguists who study
language form is a real and quite unfortu-
nate one, but we both probably agree that
this gulf has been bridged progressively in
the last years, at least in some realms. This
will undoubtedly increase the knowledge
of the types of problems different language
researchers seek to solve, and the often
intricate details involved in the problems
themselves.
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